

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CAINE SHEEHY,

Plaintiff,

Hon. Ellen S. Carmody

v.

Case No. 1:15-cv-001

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL  
SECURITY,

Defendant.

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**OPINION**

This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. On March 30, 2015, the parties agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. (Dkt. #10). Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons articulated herein, the Commissioner's decision is **reversed and this matter remanded for further factual findings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).**

### **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. *See Willbanks v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services*, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. *See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services*, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).

The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. *See Garner v. Heckler*, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. *See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Services*, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. *See Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); *Bogle v. Sullivan*, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. *See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services*, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984).

As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. *See Mullen v. Bowen*, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This

standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. *See Bogle*, 998 F.2d at 347; *Mullen*, 800 F.2d at 545.

### **PROCEDURAL POSTURE**

Plaintiff was 30 years of age on his alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 161). He successfully completed high school and worked previously as a cook. (Tr. 39, 51). Plaintiff applied for benefits on September 6, 2012, alleging that he had been disabled since October 1, 2011, due to a broken back/back fusion, nerve damage in his left leg, and degenerative disc disease. (Tr. 161-74, 205). Plaintiff also asserted that he suffered from significant emotional impairments. (Tr. 45). Plaintiff's applications were denied, after which time he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 56-160).

On May 13, 2013, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Joseph Doyle with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (Tr. 34-55). In a written decision dated August 9, 2013, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 19-28). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (Tr. 1-5). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.

### **ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ'S DECISION**

The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).<sup>1</sup> If the Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional capacity. *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and he can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); *Cohen*, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. *See Bowen v. Yuckert*, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); *Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*,

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- <sup>1</sup>1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be "disabled" regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b));
  2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found "disabled" (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c));
  3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and which "meets or equals" a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of "disabled" will be made without consideration of vocational factors (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d));
  4. If an individual is capable of performing work he or she has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e));
  5. If an individual's impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(f)).

127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from (1) degenerative disc disease; (2) lower back pain; and (3) obesity, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 21-23). As for Plaintiff's allegations of emotional impairment, the ALJ found that such were not severe. (Tr. 22). With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform sedentary work subject to the following limitations: (1) he can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps, and stairs; (2) he can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and engage in activities requiring balance; and (3) he should avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected heights and the operational control of moving machinery. (Tr. 23).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform, his limitations notwithstanding. *See Richardson*, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, "a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs" is needed to meet the burden. *O'Banner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services*, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). This standard requires more than mere intuition or conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant can perform specific jobs in the national economy. *See Richardson*, 735 F.2d at 964. Accordingly, ALJs routinely question vocational experts in an attempt to determine whether there exist a significant number of

jobs which a particular claimant can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. Such was the case here, as the ALJ questioned a vocational expert.

The vocational expert testified that there existed in the state of Michigan approximately 4,300 jobs which an individual with Plaintiff's RFC could perform, such limitations notwithstanding. (Tr. 50-52). This represents a significant number of jobs. *See Born v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services*, 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir. 1990); *Hall v. Bowen*, 837 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1988); *Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security*, 170 Fed. Appx. 369, 374 (6th Cir., Mar. 1, 2006). The ALJ concluded, therefore, that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ's conclusion that he does not suffer from a severe emotional impairment is not supported by substantial evidence.

A severe impairment is defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities," 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c), and which lasts or can be expected to last "for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Basic work activities include: (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b); *see also*, *Despins v. Commissioner of Social Security*, 257 Fed. Appx. 923, 929 n.2 (6th Cir., Dec. 14, 2007).

An impairment "can be considered not severe only if it is a slight abnormality that minimally affects work ability regardless of age, education, and experience." *Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security*, 486 F.3d 234, 243 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Higgs v. Bowen*,

880 F.2d 860, 862 (6th Cir.1988)); *see also*, *Williamson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services*, 796 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1986) (an impairment is less than severe only if it is a “slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education and work experience”).

Step two of the sequential disability process is considered a “de minimus hurdle” designed to subject to dismissal only those claims which are “totally groundless” from a medical standpoint. *Rogers*, 486 F.3d at 243 n.2; *Despins*, 257 Fed. Appx. at 929; *Higgs*, 880 F.2d at 860. As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, “this lenient interpretation of the severity requirement in part represents the courts’ response to the Secretary’s questionable practice in the early 1980s of using the step two regulation to deny meritorious claims without proper vocational analysis.” *Long v. Apfel*, 1 Fed. Appx. 326, 331 (6th Cir., Jan. 9, 2001) (quoting *Higgs*, 880 F.2d at 862).

The record indicates that Plaintiff suffers from a severe emotional impairment. A July 26, 2007 psychiatric examination concluded that Plaintiff suffered from (1) mood disorder; (2) anxiety disorder; and (3) personality disorder with narcissistic traits. (Tr. 279-84). Plaintiff’s care providers reported that Plaintiff was suffering from depression and mood swings. (Tr. 289, 310-11). A December 12, 2012 psychiatric examination concluded that Plaintiff was suffering major depressive disorder, severe. (Tr. 314-17).

While the medical record in this matter is not extensive, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff does not experience a severe emotional impairment is in error. While the degree of limitation imposed by Plaintiff’s emotional impairments is subject to reasonable debate, it is not reasonable to conclude that Plaintiff’s emotional impairments do not limit

his ability to perform basic work activities. In sum, the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff does not suffer from any severe emotional impairment is not supported by substantial evidence.

The Court concludes that the harmless error standard articulated in *Maziarz v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services*, 837 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1987), is inapplicable in this circumstance. At step two of the sequential disability analysis articulated above, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment. In *Maziarz*, the court held that where the ALJ finds the presence of a severe impairment at step two and proceeds to continue through the remaining steps of the analysis, the alleged failure to identify as severe some other impairment constitutes harmless error so long as the ALJ considered the entire medical record in rendering his decision. *Id.* at 244; *see also, Kirkland v. Commissioner of Social Security*, 528 Fed. Appx. 425, 427 (6th Cir., May 22, 2013) ("so long as the ALJ considers all the individual's impairments, the failure to find additional severe impairments. . .does not constitute reversible error"). Here, the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff's emotional impairments in assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Thus, the ALJ's failure to find that Plaintiff suffered from a severe emotional impairment is not harmless. *See Mish v. Commissioner of Social Security*, 2011 WL 836750 at \*1-2 (W.D. Mich., Mar. 4, 2011). This failure likewise leads to the conclusion that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence.

While the Court finds that the ALJ's decision fails to comply with the relevant legal standards, Plaintiff can be awarded benefits only if "all essential factual issues have been resolved" and "the record adequately establishes [his] entitlement to benefits." *Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's*, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); *see also, Brooks v. Commissioner of Social Security*, 531 Fed. Appx. 636, 644 (6th Cir., Aug. 6, 2013). This latter requirement is satisfied



“where the proof of disability is overwhelming or where proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking.” *Faucher*, 17 F.3d at 176; *see also, Brooks*, 531 Fed. Appx. at 644.

Evaluation of Plaintiff’s claim requires the resolution of certain factual disputes which this Court is neither competent nor authorized to undertake in the first instance. Moreover, there does not exist compelling evidence that Plaintiff is disabled. Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for further factual findings, including but not necessarily limited to, an accurate assessment of the severe impairments from which Plaintiff suffers, an assessment of his residual functional capacity, and a determination as to whether there exists a significant number of jobs which Plaintiff is capable of performing despite his limitations.

### **CONCLUSION**

For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is **vacated and the matter remanded for further factual findings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)**. A judgment consistent with this opinion will enter.

Date: October 21, 2015

/s/ Ellen S. Carmody  
ELLEN S. CARMODY  
United States Magistrate Judge